When inspection fails
Six incidents, drawn from official investigations and public reporting. In each one, the safeguard that failed was not a design code or a material spec — it was the gap between an inspection on paper and what actually happened in the field. Each case study ends with how SureSight closes that specific gap.
Four bolts, no record: the Alaska Airlines 1282 door plug
A door plug was opened for rework at the factory and closed without its four retaining bolts. No removal record was made, so the inspection of the closure never happened.
The wrong flange: the Martinez refinery fire
A contract crew opened Flange 4 instead of Flange 3 on a 600°F hot-oil system. Three-day fire, ~$924M in damage. Nothing at the point of work verified which flange was being opened.
The inspector who was also the trainer: Air Midwest 5481
A mechanic in training skipped nine steps while rigging elevator cables, and his trainer signed off the inspection. 21 people died. The record showed two stamps and a finished job.
Seventeen years without a climb: the Camp Fire transmission tower
A worn hook on a transmission tower broke and started a fire that killed 85. The tower had not been climbed for inspection since at least 2001, despite visible wear.
A finding without follow-through: the Longview tank failure
An inspection called the tank "not fit for continued service" ten months before it failed, killing 11. The gap wasn't detection — it was follow-through.
The daily inspection that didn't happen: a $1.2M repeat
After a trench fatality and a federal settlement, a random OSHA inspection found the same failures again — including no daily excavation inspections.